NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 25 | Number 4

Article 8

6-1-1947

Evidence -- Employer's Vicarious Liability for
Negligent Operation of Automotive Vehicle -Presumptions from Ownership
Henry L. Harkey

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry L. Harkey, Evidence -- Employer's Vicarious Liability for Negligent Operation of Automotive Vehicle -- Presumptions from Ownership,
25 N.C. L. Rev. 491 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol25/iss4/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

19471

NOTES AND COMMENTS

is indeed a factor in the test of pre-enforcement justiciability the United
States Supreme Court seems peculiarly influenced by it.
With increasing state and federal legislation regulating business
activities and civil rights,28 it is safe to assume that persons such as
petitioners in the instant case will continue to resort to the declaratory
judgment procedure as a possible mode of obtaining surcease from the
restraints of such legislation before actually violating its provisions. The
fact that their chances of even getting such complaints considered on
their merits will probably vary with the place of the enacting legislature
and of the court in the governmental hierarchy is an anomaly. The
anomaly is the more serious because the higher the prestige, and probably the effect, of such legislation, the less opportunity there will be for
obtaining pre-enforcement relief.
A repudiation of the doctrine of Ex parte Young9 to lift state immunity from such actions, and legislation making the United States
suable in such actions might help to de-emphasize the threat of enforcement as a factor and lead to its repudiation by the highest Court for
reasons already suggested. However, if this procedural aspect be not the
crux of the problem, but merely a handy device to buttress the Supreme
Court's desire not to handle such cases before actual violation as a matter
of policy,30 then the anomoly will probably remain until the court reconsiders this policy in the light of the quandary in which it places the
affected individuals, and therein finds it wanting. Perhaps the dissent
in the instant case, particularly that of Mr. Justice Black, presages such
a reconsideration.
J. DicxsoN PHILLIPS, JR.
Evidence-Employer's Vicarious Liability for Negligent Operation
of Automotive Vehicle-Presumptions from Ownership
In Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines,1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held in a four to three decision that the plaintiff failed to make
Barber Examiners, 45 N. M. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941) (regulating prices in
barber shops). Contra: De Cano v. State, 7 Wash. 2d 613, 110 P. 2d 627 (1941).
For earlier cases to the same effect as these and those in note 26, supra, see
BORcHARD, op. cit. supra, at 969-971, and cases there collected.
" Prqbably most striking recent examples are those federal and state measures
designed to curb subversive activities, particularly among federal and state employees. The president's executive order "prescribing procedure for the administration of an employee's loyalty program in the executive branch of the government," Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947), has already been questioned by eminent jurists as respects its procedural sufficiency. Chafee, Griswold,
Katz, and Scott, The Loyalty Order, N. Y. Times, April 13, 1947, §4, p. 8E, col. 4.
A recent example of state legislation on the same subject is North Carolina's
amendment to N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-12 (1943) by (1947) session of N. C. General Assembly, S. B. No. 1028; H. B. No. 980.
"' See notes 22 and 24 supra.
"8See notes 17 and 18 supra.
L227 N. C. 193, 41 S. E. 2d 586 (1947).
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a case under the doctrine of respondeat superior and should have been
nonsuited below. His evidence was that about 1:15 a.m. he was awakened by '!an awful noise!' and found that a large tractor-trailer type
truck had crashed into his. combihed cafe and living quarters, .which was
100 .feet from" an intersection, and that the truck and trailer had the
name- of. the defendant painted thereon. Plaintiff -further testified, over
objection; that Belton King, while- standing beside the tractor which
was inside the cafe,, said that he was driving the truck; that he fell asleep
aiid lost control -ofthe truck, and "tore it all to pieces." The statement
was made. two minutes after the collision. The defendant in itg answer
admitted only that it is engaged in the business of hauling freight by
motor truck upon the highways of North Carolina and other states.
There was no evidence that the truck was or had ever been used in the
business" of the defendant. Neither was there any evidence that the
driver was then or had ever been in the employ of the defendant. The
defendant denied all the essential allegations of the complaint, so the
plaintiff was put to proof of every fact necessary to support' his action.
The defendant, having no duty to explain, offered no evidence. On
appeal, to sustain his recovery against the owner, the plaintiff relied on
a presumption of agency supposedly established by Jeffrey v. Osage
Mfg. Co.2 However, the defendant relied on the same authurity and
the court cited that case as settling the question, that there is no presumption of liability from ownership of a motor vehicle in North Carolina. The driver's declaration was ruled out, as inadmissible against this
defendant.3 The plaintiff, having no evidence in the record. on agency
and scope of employment, failed to make a prima facie case; his recovery was reversed.
It is said that the plaintiff.must offer competent evidence on four
essentials, requisite elements, to establish a prima facie case for the jury:
(1) that the truck or automobile inflicting the injury was at the time
operated in a negligent manner, or that the driver thereof was guilty of
negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury, (2) where the
driver or operator of the conveyance at the time of the injury was other
-than the owner, the plaintiff must offer evidence tending to show the
ownership of the vehicle if such owner is sought to be charged with the
negligence of the driver or operator, (3) that if the injury was caused
by the negligence of an agent, evidence must be offered tending to establish the agency, (4) that the agent or employee at the time of the injury
was acting within the scope of his employment as contemplated and
defined by law.4
-197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
See note 37 infra, for discussion.

University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941); Van
Landingham v. Sewing Machine Co., 207 N. C. 355, 177 S. E. 126 (1934); Cole

' Smith v. Duke
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Difficulty in obtaining evidence tending to prove the element of negligence and proximate cause is no greater than in other negligence
cases. If ownership is not stipulated, there is usually enough circumstantial evidence available to prove it. In certain cases no evidence of
ownership is required.5 However, sufficient evidence tending to prove
agency,6 and even if that be conceded, then evidence tending to prove
that ihe transaction out of which the injury arose was within the scope
of employment of the agent, 7 is extremely difficult to produce. This is
true since no one but the employer and employee could, if they would,
furnish direct evidence on these elements and the thin mist of circumstantial evidence may have evaporated during the interval before the
plaintiff's attorney is given the case.
The dissenting opinion, recognizing the plaintiff's plight and observing the defendant's silence, advocates allowing a "presumption" of the
third and fourth elements to arise from the introduction of evidence of
negligence of the driver and ownership of the truck by the defendant.8
Such a presumption, better labeled an inference of fact,9 would force
the apparent truck owner to clarify the-issues by offering the facts peculiarly within his knowledge or risk an adverse verdict. It is not a
change in the substantive law, but in the quantum or mechanics of proof
that is called for.
It will be interesting to note the existing judicial handicap to just
compensation under the doctrine of respondeat superior in. North Carv. Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1933) ; Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.,
197 N. C. 724. 150 S. E. 503 (1929) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E.
5015 (1929) ; Cotton v. Transportation Co., 197 N. C. 709 150 S. 1. 505 (1929).
Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 39, 12 S. S. 2d 667, 669 (1941) ("This
court has adopted the view that the employer is liable where the employee causes
an injury by the negligent operation of his own car, used in the prosecution of
the employer's business, when the latter knew, or should have known, that he was
so using it."); Barrow v. Keel, 213 N. C. 373, 196 S. E. 366 (1938) ; Miller v.
Wood, 210 N. C. 520, 187 S.E. 765 (1936) ; Donalson v. Western Union, 207 N. C.
790, 178 S. E. 603 (1935) ;see note, 140 A. L.R. 1150 (1942).
'Brown v.Wood,201 N. C.309, 312, 160 S.E. 281, 283 (1931) (where owner
visited hospitalized plaintiff, offered to pay medical bills,
and said "everything was
all right," held to be susceptible of broad meaning and interpretation, a jury question as this evidence was competent to prove agency).
' Salmon v. Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 589, 27 S.E. 2d 647, 649 (1943) ("Proof
of general employment alone is not sufficient to impose liability. It must be made
to appear that the particular act in which the employee was at the time engaged
was within the scope of his employment and was being performed in the furtherance of the master's business."); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E.
2d 283 (1940) (relation of master and servant must exist at time of and: in respect to very transaction out of which the injury arose).
8 Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines, 227 N. C. 193, 199, 41 S. E. 2d 586, 590
(1947).
9
Pozzobon v.Q'Donnell, 36 P. 2d 236 (1934) (instruction that law presumes
person operating automobile is doing so as agent of owner held to be erroneous
because of use of word "presumes" instead of word "infers," that is, the jury from
proof of ownership may draw conclusion that driver was acting as agent of
owner, but it is not bound to do so).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

olina and also the background occasioning the timely opinion of Justice
Seawell and the minority. Only an analysis of North Carolina cases of
imputed negligence has been attempted. 0 An effort has been made to
avoid the partially distinct and partially overlapping phases of the doctrine of respondeat superior; namely, the liability of the owner of the
"family car,"' 1 and the liability of the employer to the invitee passenger
2
of his driver.'
Broad language of a comparatively early case supports the proposed
view. 1 3

In 1918 Chief Justice Clark stated, "The natural presumption

is that one who is employed in operating an automobile is doing so in
the service of the owner . . it will be difficult for the plaintiff in such
cases to show that the automobile was being driven and operated under
the direct supervision of the owner, which was a matter peculiarly in
the owner's knowledge. We thing there was error to nonsuit the plain-

"0The owner or person in control, being liable, for his own negligence, is not
liable for that of another, gratuitously using the automobile. McLamb v. Beasley,
218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940); Robertson v. Aldrige, 185 N. C. 292,
116 S. E. 742 (1923) (automobile is not inherently dangerous) ; Linville v. Nissen,
162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Cook v. Home, 198 N. C. 739, 153 S. E. 315
(1930) (furnishing unlighted vehicle at night, negligence per se) ; Jones v. Stancil,
198 N. C. 541, 52 S. E. 492 (1930) ; Taylor v. Caudle, 210 N. C. 60, 185 S. E. 446
(1936) (owner negligent in intrusting automobile to reckless and incompetent
driver; one given to habitual and excessive use of liquor) ; Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 692, 40 S. E. 2d 345 (1946) (owner may be negligent
in permitting 13-year-old daughter to drive) ; see note, 42 A. L. R. 899 (1926).
"lVaughn v. Booker, 217 N. C. 479, 481, 8 S. E. 2d 603, 604 (1940) ("True,
it is the recognized principle that a parent is not ordinarily responsible for the
torts of a minor child, solely by reason of the relationship, and that generally
liability will only be imputed on some principle of agency or employment. But it
is also held in our opinions by the great weight of authority that where a parent
owns a car for the convenience and pleasure of the family, a minor child, who is
a member of the family, though using the car at the time for his own purposes,
with the parent's consent or approval, will be regarded as representing the parent
in such use, and the question of liability for negligent injury may be considered
and determined in that aspect. It will be noted that the very genesis of the family
purpose car doctrine is agency, and the question here presented is governed by
the rules of principal and agent or of master and servant.") ; Hawes v. Haynes,
219 N. C. 535, 14 S. E. 2d 503 (1941) (evidence of prior use by others, members of owner's family, necessary); Wallace v. Squires, 186 N. C. 339, 119 S. E.
569 (1923) (where there was evidence that son habitually used family car, it was
incumbent upon father to show that son had no permission at that particular time
to drive that car).
" Russell v. Cutshall, 223 N. C. 353, 354, 26 S. E. 2d 866, 867 (1943)
("Ordinarily, one who is engaged to operate a motor vehicle has no implied
authority, by virtue of his employment, to invite or permit third persons to ride;
the employer is not liable for personal injuries sustained by the invitee while riding
in such machine except, perhaps where willfully or maliciously inflicted.");
Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N. C. 270, 176 S. E. 568 (1934) (to recover for
ordinary negligence there need be evidence that driver was transporting passenger
for or on behalf of the owner) ; Cotton v. Transportation Co., 197 N. C. 709, 150
S. E. 505 (1929); Peters et al. v. A. & P. et al., 194 N. C. 173, 138 S. E. 595
(1927); see Note, 8 N. C. L. REv. 306 (1930).
" Sutton v. Lyons, 156 N. C. 3, 72 S. E: 4 (1911) (although often cited as
allowing the presumption from ownership of an automobile, the case merely presents a comparable situation where agency was presumed; held, to be defendant's
duty to affirmatively show that she was not operator of mill situated on her land).
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However, a survey of subsequent cases shows the unpredictabil-

ity of suffering a nonsuit.
No case directly in point where both agency and scope of employment
were inferred has been found. One case, where the precise point was not
involved, contemplated that it might be done.' 5 But, there is a distinct
line of authority granting one-half the proposed inference.' 6 Scope of
employment has repeatedly been inferred from evidence tending to prove
agency. However, the defendants attorney can find an equally strong
line of cases, where the inference was not allowed. 17 Neither line of
cases entertain an unbroken chronological sequence.
Leading cases allowing the inference of scope of employment include
Freeman v. Dalton's where it is stated, "There may be a presumption
that the car was being used in the defendant's business, but it is not a
presumption of law, but one of fact, and it does not shift the burden of
the issue to the defendant in the sense that he must rebut the presumption, or disprove the allegations by the greater weight of the evidence.
It merely is, in itself, evidence of the fact and carries the case to the
jury." It has been said that Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.' 9 limits the
doctrine, ° possibly due to the court's terse restatement of the facts as
follows: "A truck, which is in itself a business vehicle devoted exclusively to business purposes, is found on the highway on a business
day during business hours, operated by the regular employee of the
defendant and one whose regular business or employment was the duty
Clark v. Sweaney,
280,538,
95 S.
"'8Freeman
v. Dalton,175183N.N.C. C.
111E.S.568
E. (1918).
863 (1922) (distinguished in
Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 135 S. E. 852 (1926), limited by Martin v. Bus

Line, 197 N. C. 720, 724, 150 S. E. 501, 503 (1929) by quotation, 'Every opinion,

to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which
it was delivered, Marshall, C. J., U. S. v. Burr, 4 Cranch, 470.').
" Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. 2d 667 (1941); West v. Baking
Co., 2(3 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935); Puckett v. Dyer, 203 N. C. 684, 167
S. E. 43 (1932) ; Lewis v. Basketeria Stores, Inc., 201 N. C. 849, 161 S. E. 924
(1931); Lazarus v. Grocery Co., 201 N. C. 817, 161 S. E. 553 (1931); Jeffrey
v. Osage Mfg. Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929); Misenheimer v. Hayman,
195 N. C. 613, 143 S. E. 1 (1928); Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C. 538, 111 S. E.
863 7(1922).
" Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Smith v. Moore, 220 N. C. 165,
16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283
(1940); Tribble v. Swinson, 213 N. C. 550, 196 S. E. 820 (1938); Swicegood v.
Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937); Cole v. Funeral Home, 207
N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1934) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E.
501 (1929) ; Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 130 S. E. 617 (1926) ; Reich v. Cone,
180 N. C. 267, 104 S. E. 530 (1913).
I8 183 N. C. 538, 111 S. E. 863 (1922).
10197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
"- Brown v. Wood, 201 N. C. 309, 160 S. E. 291 (1931) (where the court
phrased the question on appeal, "Does proof of ownership of a pleasure car constitute a prima facie case of liability against the owner for injuries resulting from
the negligent operation thereof by the driver? The law answers the question in
the negative," and cited Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.,. 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503

(1929).
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of driving-and operating said vehicle. We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that these facts furnish a sound and reasonable basis for a jury
to infer that the truck at the time was being operated in the furtherance
of the master's business." This case was submitted to the jury although
the defendant offered uncontradicted evidence that the driver had taken
the truck during the lunch hour without permission and to visit his sick
mother near whose house the collision occurred. Merely from the
answer an inference was allowed in West v. Baking Co.21 where the
defendant admitted "that the defendant driver was an employee of the
company ..
that as -such employee was authorized and directed from
time to time to drive said truck." This was held to be evidence tending
to prove that the employee was driving the truck within the scope of
his employment at the time of the injury. Where an insurance collector
had made a collection a few minutes before the accident, which was in
the middle of the afternoon of a working day, the court held that from
these facts a reasonable inference could be drawn that the employee was
engaged in the duties of his employment -and that this inference could
not be defeated in the few minutes it took the employee to drive to the
scene of the accident, still within his territory,22 and cited the principle:
"That where it is doubtful whether a servant in injuring a third person
was acting within the scope of his authority, it has been said that the
doubt will be resolved against the master because he set the servant in
motion. '23 However, there was a similar division of the court as in the
instant case. The three dissenting justices concluded that the evidence
was not sufficient to be submitted to the jury in that "it fails to show
that the relation of master and servant existed... at the time of and in
respect to the very transaction out of whih the injury arose, a fatal
defect in the plaintiff's case," and even cited Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.
as supporting their view.
Leading cases adhering to strict proof of the elements of the owner's
liability by the plaintiff include Grier v. Grier,24 where an automobile
salesman was driving a "demonstration" car and by the defendant's
evidence was on a pleasure trip. The court spoke of a requirement that
evidence should be in the record of an act in furtherance of the employer's business. In Cole v. FuneralHome25 it was held that the doctrine in Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co. was not applicable, although the
injury occurred duriifg regular business hours, for there was no evidence
that the automobile was a business vehicle and there was no competent
evidence that the driver was engaged in the business of his employer.
21208
N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935).
22
PinnL' v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. 2d 667 (1941).

'-39
'4192 C.N.J.C.1274
760,(1925).
130 S. E. 617 (1926).
2-207

N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1934).
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In McLamb v. Beasley2 the regular driver was permitted to take the
delivery truck home each evening, a distance of three miles. Plaintiff
offered the defendant's bookkeeper who testified, ". . . and if anything
should have to be hauled or delivered after the store was closed, we could
get in touch with him and he would do it ... not in all the -time I worked
there did I ever know Hood to be called on during the night. He was
simply working there, and we all felt, if an emergency arose, we were
liable to be called on." It was held that this evidence, in its entirety,
expressed no more than a sense of loyalty on the part of the employees
of the defendant and that it did not even carry the suggestion that
Hood had the truck in order that he might be accessible after closing
hours. The defendant did not offer evidence. The dissenting opinion
stated, "The fact that he did not deny the wrong done by his driver was
a pregnant circumstance for the jury to consider."
When the inference has been denied, the plaintiff's difficulty in proving the owner's liability for his driver's negligence during business hours
is readily seen. The difficulty is increased when the tort occurs after
28
2
normal business hours. 7 Sunday cases present additional obstacles.
In Smith v. Moore29 the plaintiff changed his plans for the Sunday evening and accepted the salesman's invitation to dinner in a nearby town
and drove the salesman's "demonstration" car to that place at the request of the salesman to "try it out." Several months previously, the
salesman and his employer had interviewed the plaintiff as a prospective
purchaser of a car. After dinner, on the way home, the salesman driving, plaintiff was negligently injured and recovered from the employer.
However, the appellate opinion held that the plaintiff should have been
nonsuited as to this defendant for "the record clearly discloses that the
request that plaintiff drive Yelton's car on the trip over and 'try it out'
was purely incidental to the primary purpose, which was social. Even
if we conceded that the trip was in part for demonstration purposes ...
which is not supported by the evidence, the business ended and the party
was on as soon as they gathered at the home of Mrs. Cos."
We might assume, even if the law of respondeat superior in North
:6 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940).
'Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C.
308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E. 501
(1929) ; Peters et al. v. A. & P. Tea Co. et al., 194 N. C. 173, 138 S. E. 595 (1927).
"Smith v. Moore, 220 N. C. 165, 16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941); Riddle v. Whisnant, 220 N. C. 131, 16 S. E. 2d 698 (1941) (where the Act of 1741, N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §103-1, which assesses a penalty of one dollar on those who
exercise the work of their ordinary calling on Sunday, is cited); Tyson v.
Frutchey, 194 N. C. 750, 140 S. E. 718 (1927) ; Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 130
S. E. 617 (1926).
"29220 N. C. 165, 16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941) (liability of master is not to be
determined by the extent of authority of agent, but by purpose of act in which
agent was engaged at the time).
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Carolina be settled, that the plaintiffs in substantially similar cases re-

ceive unequal justice due to the uncertain value of shreds of circumstantial evidence."" The defendant may offer evidence that the driver
was on a personal venture and the plaintiff, having no knowledge of facts
to the contrary, may find himself nonsuited ;31 especially is this true for
32
injuries caused by vehicles other than of a recognized business type.
The defendant may remain silent, even may leave unexplained how a
large tractor-trailer bearing his name left the highway in the early
morning hours and wrought havor as in the instant case. He should be
required to offer evidence that it was stolen or leased, 33 or that he loaned
the large expensively operated vehicle to someone for a pleasure trip
and have the credibility of that explanation tested by the jury. Sometimes the plaintiff overlooks the available authority for an inference of
scope of employment, 34 but always he has the risk that all the evidence
available to him tending to prove agency will be determined a mere
scintilla. 35 The plaintiff in his efforts to produce sufficient evidence of
agency and scope may prove himself out of court.,3 Again, he may
rely too heavily on the admissibility of the utterances of the driver, made
at the scene, and discover too late that he has nothing left when they
are ruled out as hearsay a7 From the very nature of the action, the
" Misenheimer v. Hayman, 195 N. C. 613, 614, 143 S. E. 1, 2 (1928) (Plaintiff's
recovery was sustained over defendant's contention that there was no evidence of
scope of employment. "There is at least some evidence that the driver of the truck
was acting within the scope of his authority and in the furtherance of his master's
business ... there is evidence that his truck was frequently seen on the road in
question coming from and returning to the city, according to one witness, sometimes once a day and sometimes every other day. While the evidence on the
point is not necessarily convincing we cannot hold as a matter of law that it is
devoid of such probative force as not to require its submission to the jury.").
"'Rogers v. Black Mountain, 224 N. C. 119, 29 S. E. 2d 203 (1944) ; Swicegood v. Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937).
" Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760,
130 S. E. 617 (1926).
" By proper phrasing of a "trip lease," the owner, though paying the driver's
regular wages, may relieve himself from liability for the driver's negligence for
lessee shipper was held responsibile on respondeat superior; therefore by implication the owner is not liable. Wood v. Miller, 226 N. C. 567, 39 S. E. 2d 608
(1946).
Salmon v. Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Swicegood v.
Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937).
"&Smith v. Mariakalds, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945) (plaintiff's wife
3S

testified that she saw the driver in the defendant's cafe, cleaning tables on the night

of the accident, and had seen him there practically every day).
" The plaintiff of necessity offers the driver as his witness, who testifies that
his was a pleasure trip, and is unable to secure rontradictory evidence that the
driver was on the business of the owner. Riddle v. Whisnant, 220 N. C. 131, 16
S. E. 2d 698 (1941).
87 North Carolina courts in recent years have tended to make it harder to get
in extra-judicial admissions of agents. This is shown by the fact they exclude
them to prove agency. Agency must be shown aliunde before the agent's admission will be received. Hunsucher v. Corbitt, 187 N. C. 496, 122 S. E. 378 (1924).
More recent cases exclude them as proof of scope of employment.

Caulder v.
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plaintiff is unable to secure the competent judicial admissions of the
frightened employee who is fearful of his continued employment. Extrajudicial admissions of the driver need to be distinguished from those
38
infrequently made by the owner which are competent if relevant.
Since the plaintiff has the burden of producing all the evidence, the
owner or more often his insurers, by answering in denials under the
supposed wisdom of preventing unfounded claims, places an often insurmountable burden on the plaintiff. Of what value is a judgment
against a financially irresponsible driver? We might observe that the
owners of vehicles who employ chauffeurs and the owners of commercial
vehicles have definite tactical if not legal advantage over the injured
plaintiff; whereas, the negligent owner who drives his own vehicle is
liable solely on proof of negligence proximately causing the injury.
The rule of the majority of jurisdictions is that proof of ownership
of the automobile by the defendant at the time of the accident creates
a prima facie case by inference that the negligent operator was the
servant or agent of the defendant and was engaged in his business,
acting within the scope. of his employment. 39 When adopted by statute
the rule has been interpreted to be a rule of evidence only ;40 however,
at least one jurisdiction regards it as a change in the substantive law.41
Sound reasons advanced in the decided cases for the adoption of
the inference, whether by statute or judicial decision, include the following: (1) That if the defendant is in fact the owner, it should be
easier for him to bring forward evidence showing that the driver was
not his servant or not acting within his scope of employment.42 (2) That
experience demonstrates that the probabilities are that an automobile
figuring in an accident will be driven by the owner or by someone for
Motor Sales, Inc., 221 N. C. 437, 20 S. E. 2d 338 (1942); STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EviDENCE §169 (1946).
Barnhill, J., by dicta, in the instant case says,

"Even if said statement constitutes a part of the res gestae, it is not admissible

against this defendant as evidence, either of negligence or agency, for the reason
the record fails to disclose any testimony tending to show that he was at the time
the agent of the defendant." If this be adopted, it is a new restriction for the
admission is clearly evidence of negligence when part of the res gestae, notwithstanding agency, for even that of a by-stander would be. Queen City Coach
Co. v. Lee, 218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. 2d 341 (1940); STANSBURY, NORTn CAROLINA EvmENcE §164 (1946).
as Toler v. Savage, 226 N. C. 209, 37 S. E. 2d 485 (1946); Tribble v. Swinson, 213 N. C. 550, 196 S. E. 820 (1938).
" See Notes, 122 A. L. R. 228 (1939), 96 A. L. R. 634 (1935), 74 A. L. R.
951 (1931), 42 A. L. R. 898 (1926).
Greenbury v. Gorvine, 279 Mass. 339, 181 N. E. 128 (1932).
'1 Woodfin v. Insel, 13 Tenn. App. 493 (1931).
4-'Howard
v. Amerson, 236 I1. App. 587 (1925); Borger v. McKeith, 196
Wis. 315, 224 N. W. 102 (1944) (the exigencies of justice require application of
the rule); Toranto v. Hattaway, 219 Ala. 520, 122 So. 816 (1929) (owner has
special knowledge of relation between himself and the driver); Newell v. Contracting Co., 223 Ala. 109, 134 So. 870 (1931) (the rule that proof of ownership
raises presumption of owner's responsibility applies when car is found unattended
in apparent violation of traffic regulations, thereby causing injury).
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whose negligence he will be responsible, and if not true, it is fair that
he be required to explain. 43 (3) That the present extensive use of the
automobile, causing commensurate injuries, has taken it beyond a neighborhood affair and makes it more difficult to establish facts necessary
to recovery and compels inquiry'into the existing rule. 44 (4) That the
principle advanced is the same as that permitting juries to infer, in the
absence of an explanation to the contrary, that a man found in possession
45
of recently stolen goods, is the personr who stole.
Other jurisdictions have said that by the rule one having a just and
meritorious case is protected, .and no hardship is imposed upon the
owner. 46 Also, it has been held that the presumption of the owner's
responsibility is based upon policy and not upon a fact inference. 47
The only arguments against adoption are outworn precedent and the
legalistic fallacy that one presumption cannot be founded upon another.48 This seems to be splitting one presumption into two, rather
than basing one on another. 49 It could be argued that the rule should
be limited to business or commercial vehicles,5° but it is believed that the
better reasoning is with the majority which makes no distinction.51 The
reasons for the rule extend to pleasure type vehicles.
It is suggested that North Carolina adopt the modern rule applicable
to this motor age-a rule of evidence that the plaintiff having offered
evidence tending to prove negligence of the driver and ownership of the
vehicle by the defendant be deemed to have'established a prima facie case
for the jury thereby placing the duty on the defendant of going forward
with evidence of lack of agency or lack of action within the scope of
employment, 52 otherwise risking an adverse verdict. The weight of the
inference should be for the jury to determine. 53
HENRY L. HARKEY.
Ahlberg v. Griggs, 158 Minn. 11, 196 N. W. 652 (1924) (it is reasonable to
presume that a person driving another's automobile on a pubic highway is doing
so rightfully as agent of owner); Laundry v. Oversen, 187 Iowa 284, 174 N. W.
255 (1919) (the rule is a mere inference that an owner is likely to be in control
of his own property) ; see Note, 42 A. L. P. 903 (1926).
"Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines, 227 N. C. 193, 199, 41 S. E. 2d 586, 590
(1947) (dissenting opinion, Seawell, J.).
Dowing v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672, 135 So. 288 (1931).
"Baker v. Maseek, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919).
Philip v. Schlager, 214 Wis. 370, 253 N. W. 394 (1934).
,STANSBURY,

NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENcE §215,. n. 43 (1946).

"See Note, 42 A. L. R. 902 (1926).
"O
Double v. Myers, 305 Pa. 226, 157 Atl. 610 (1931) (limits the rule to commercial vehicles, used for commercial pbrposes).
"'See Note, 96 A. L. R. 644 (1935).
"See Note, 8 Nj C. L. REv. 298 (1930) (author commenting on Jeffrey v.
Osage Mfg. Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S.E. 503 (1929) assumed that case to have
adopted the rule in North Carolina giving an inference of scope and suggests the
basis, a "logical core").
"'There is a split of authority whether the court may as a matter of law directa
verdict against the plaintiff when the defendant offers uncontradicted evidence that
the driver was not the owner's agent, or if he was, that he was not acting within

